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CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 1361
INTRODUCTION
In Against Obligation: The Multiple Sources of Authority in a Liberal
Democracy, Professor Abner Greene throws down the gauntlet to those
scholars, politicians, and activists who believe that realizing the ideal of e
pluribus unum (out of many, one) as well as constitutional principles of liberty
and equality require a robust role for government. Government, he argues, is
just one source of authority among many others, and citizens – or even public
officials – have no general moral duty to obey the law. The political and
constitutional order of the United States, he contends, is profoundly
antifoundationalist. It distrusts “concentrated power” and so fractures and
divides power in many ways, providing “multiple and overlapping checking
mechanisms.”1 In a memorable phrase, Greene states: “Our constitutional order
is one of multiple repositories of power.”2
An attendant idea in his book is a conception of how the citizens within this
constitutional order live and form beliefs. The state’s laws are by no means the
only norms by which we live. “Many of us,” Greene explains, “adhere” to
other norms – “religious, philosophical, family/clan/tribal, etc.” – and there is
“no good reason” to treat those norms as “subservient to the law.”3 The state,
as his subtitle intimates, is simply one source of authority and values among
many and has no special claims upon us: “We should see all of our sources of
value, of how to live, as at least presumptively on par with each other, as equal,
even though in some circumstances we’ll have to let our separate norms go and
adhere to the law.”4 To invoke a term at the core of the recently healed Great
Schism of 1054 between the Orthodox and the Catholic Church over the status
of the “bishop of Rome,” the state is not “primus inter pares” – first among
equals.5 To the contrary, it is one among many: it must compete for the loyalty
of the people, who are not only citizens (at least the subjects of Greene’s book
are), but are also members of families, religious institutions, voluntary
1

ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3 (2012).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 2.
4 Id.
5 See Ray Ryland, Peter and the Eastern Orthodox, CATH. ANSWERS MAG., http://www.c
atholic.com/magazine/articles/peter-and-the-eastern-orthodox. (last visited June 9, 2013).
The healing of the schism evidently occurred in November 2007, when a “joint commission
of Orthodox and Catholic theologians . . . agreed that the Pope has primacy over all bishops,
though disagreements about the extent of his authority still continue.” Orthodox Recognize
Pope First Among Equals, Disagreements Remain, CATH. NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 15, 2007,
11:11 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/orthodox_recognize_pope_first_am
ong_equals_disagreements_remain.
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associations, and the like. To be sure, the state has some resources it can
marshal to “expose” its citizens to – and try to persuade them in favor of – its
views and values.6 Because sources of sovereignty are multiple and people
recognize many sources of obligation, however, citizens who wish to live by
norms other than those of the state must be allowed to do so and should remain
“free from the clutches of the state,” at least “to the fullest extent compatible
with the stable operation of government and the liberty of other persons.”7
Greene explains this in terms of “accommodating our plural obligations” and
lays out a robust right to exemptions from the demands of the state – a more
realistic right of “exit” than simply leaving the jurisdiction.8
Why should the state be so accommodating to people who wish to “depart
from law and live by their own lights”?9 Greene asserts several baselines. Of
particular interest for purposes of this Article is the baseline of doubt
concerning “whether we (even comprehensive liberals) have reached the truest
or best answers regarding the just or the good.”10 Greene refers to the need for
humility on the part of the state as to whether it has the right answers, an
agnosticism about virtue. In this Article, I will take up the gauntlet that Greene
throws down and argue against such agnosticism as well as against his
relegation of the state to simply one source of authority in competition with
others. As someone who has argued that government should play a robust role
in fostering persons’ capacities for democratic and personal self-government
and in promoting public and constitutional values, I am no doubt among those
“comprehensive liberals” Greene has in mind who suffer from insufficient
humility or modesty about the principles and values that we believe
government may and should promote. I will focus on children, a group that
receives little attention in Greene’s book, and ask about the consequences for
them of his agnosticism and his argument “against obligation” and in favor of
fracturing and dividing power.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I identifies some points on which
Greene and I agree with respect to the idea of multiple sources of sovereignty
in our constitutional order and what government may do to foster virtue and e
pluribus unum. Part II turns to some points on which we disagree. I also
identify some issues as to which it is not possible to determine agreement or
disagreement without further information. Part III focuses on children and on
the possible consequences for them of Greene’s arguments “against obligation”
and in favor of fracturing and dividing power. Children, as Greene
acknowledges, pose challenges for any argument that, like his, rests a robust
right to exit on a baseline of “knowing and voluntary choices (by adults).”11
6

GREENE, supra note 1, at 158.
Id. at 115.
8 Id. at 114.
9 Id. at 157.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 157-58.
7
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Moreover, as he and I agree, our constitutional order divides authority over
children between government and parents (and other guardians).12 In addition,
the Supreme Court has recognized that children also possess constitutional
rights of their own.13 I consider the specific examples Greene provides of how
his theory would apply to children. I also pose questions about how his theory
might apply to a situation his book does not address: the ways institutions
respond to child sexual abuse and to their obligations under mandatory
reporting laws.
Most of this Article addresses chapter two of Against Obligation, Greene’s
lengthy discussion of “Accommodating Our Plural Obligations.”14 I do not
assess the persuasiveness of his jurisprudential argument that we have no
general obligation to obey the law or of his claims about constitutional
interpretation. As my title suggests, however, I do resist his agnosticism about
“the right” or “the just” – and not only “the good” – and his conception of the
state as simply one among many sources of authority, with no special weight
or claim to our allegiance. I engage with Greene’s intricate arguments “against
political obligation”15 only indirectly as they bear on the issues of
accommodating pluralism, the status of children in a system of fractured
authority, and robust rights to opt out and live in one’s own nomic community.
I.
A.

SOME POINTS OF AGREEMENT

Our Constitutional Order Assumes Multiple Sites of Sovereignty

Over the years, I have profited from talking with Abner Greene about
various dilemmas posed by pluralism, governmental speech, and a
constitutional order premised on, as he aptly calls it, “multiple sources of
authority.” Indeed, his work has become a standard reference for me when
discussing the tensions within our constitutional order over the relationship
between government and institutions of civil society, in particular whether the
latter, as seedbeds of civic virtue, are congruent with and undergird the
political order or instead function as distinct sources of norms and values and
as buffers against state power.16 In discussing the dual authority of government
and parents over the education of children as an instantiation of this tension
and of the possible conflict between political and personal virtues and values, I
have previously observed: “The possibility of this conflict invites the question
of how much pluralism a healthy constitutional democracy can sustain in a
system in which there coexist multiple sites of sovereignty and the ideal of
12

See id. at 158.
See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
14 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 114-60.
15 Id. at 35.
16 See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 92, 302 n.69 (2013); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF
FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 81-82 & n.168 (2006).
13
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unity amidst diversity.”17 Greene tends to focus more on “centrifugal” forces,
that is, on how the norms of civil society take citizens away from the state and
its “centripetal” forces.18 I tend to focus on the tension between these two
forces. Greene sees a strong “antifoundationalism” inherent in the
constitutional order, while I see the unresolved tension between a “liberal
expectancy” of congruence (along with a “liberal anxiety” over a lack of
congruence) and a commitment to pluralism that views constitutional
democracy as sustainable even if nongovernmental groups are illiberal and
foster antidemocratic values.19 Both of us have concerns about the ideal of e
pluribus unum. Greene believes this ideal is consistent with robust rights of
exit and groups living apart from state norms.20 I am concerned about whether
this vision robs the category of citizen of any real meaning.
B.

Government May Use Persuasion to Express Its Views – and to Cultivate
Values and Virtues

Greene and I agree that government may use methods short of coercion to
persuade about public or political values and constitutional principles.21 In
previous work, and most recently with James Fleming in Ordered Liberty:
Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues, I have spoken about this as government
having the authority to engage in a formative project to promote good and
responsible citizenship.22 This formative project may promote public values
and constitutional principles such as racial equality, gender equality, tolerance,
and even respect for diversity.23 Greene has written extensively on government
speech as well as on government’s selective use of funding to promote its
ends.24 Although I do not agree with everything he says on these topics, I do
17 Linda C. McClain, Religious and Political Virtues and Values in Congruence or
Conflict?: On Smith, Bob Jones University, and Christian Legal Society, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1959, 1961 (2011) (footnote omitted).
18 GREENE, supra note 1, at 68, 188.
19 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 83, 90-91 (citing NANCY L. ROSENBLUM,
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA (2000));
McClain, supra note 17, at 1959-61.
20 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 50, 117.
21 Id. at 253.
22
See generally Linda C. McClain, Autonomy, Toleration, and Governmental Promotion
of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19
(1998) [hereinafter McClain, Autonomy]; Linda C. McClain, Toward a Formative Project of
Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1221 (2000) [hereinafter McClain,
Toward a Formative Project]. For additional discussion, see also FLEMING & MCCLAIN,
supra note 16, at 1-4, 112-18, 244-61, and MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 15-49. On the idea of
a formative project, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 270-73, 282-83 (1996).
23 MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 1-4, 112-14.
24 See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000)
(discussing whether government should use its powers of persuasion to promote any one
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agree that speech and funding are two tools government may use to promote its
ends.
While we share the conviction that government may advance its own views,
Greene seems to have a weaker commitment to what I call a formative project
and to regard it as less of an imperative. One explanation for this difference
may be his central concern with helping people escape the clutches of the state
– and its laws – rather than be grasped by it. Thus, in resisting the labeling of
his argument as one for “anarchy,” he writes: “[M]y argument doesn’t exalt the
centrifugal; government may play a role through its speech and funding in
seeking and perhaps achieving a more harmonious republic, integrated in
many ways and coalescing around common values.”25 Greene’s phrasing
seems to downplay the importance of governmental attempts at promoting a
more harmonious republic, a stance consistent with his view of government as
just one repository of the people’s power in competition for citizens’
allegiance.26 By contrast, I believe that the status of citizen and the idea of free
and equal citizenship – and the norms attendant to being a citizen – are
weighty and not simply one contender in the marketplace for the people’s
allegiance.
In addition to using its persuasive power, government, I have argued, may
also use tools like antidiscrimination laws to promote free and equal
citizenship.27 These laws are not only persuasive in expressing ideals, but also
harness the state’s coercive power by prohibiting and commanding certain
conduct from people and institutions. This, of course, raises the question of the
permissible scope of exemption from such laws when the norms these laws
embody clash with the norms of what Greene calls “nomic communities” or
“nomic groups.”28

view of what is “good” over another); Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1253 (2011) (discussing the state’s authority to create “platforms” for private speech
and whether it may advance its own values through selective exclusion from these
platforms).
25 GREENE, supra note 1, at 253 (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 4.
27 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 146-57; McClain, Autonomy, supra note
22, at 110-13; McClain, Toward a Formative Project, supra note 22, at 1242-49.
28 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 55 (“[Robert] Cover forcefully makes the case for a
broad principle of associational freedom based not on the negative, or checking, value of
dissident communities, but rather on the affirmative virtues of living according to law made
locally, by a group that constructs itself as an insular, norm-making community.”); Abner S.
Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4, 10 (1996)
(“[T]he American constitutional order is best understood as adopting a version of
‘permeable sovereignty’ that allows homogeneous nomic communities to exercise public as
well as private power, provided that the communities exercise public power in a
constitutional fashion.”).
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Religion in the Public Square? Yes and No

Greene and I agree that neither citizens nor lawmakers must shed their
religious convictions in the public square.29 We also agree that laws should not
be enacted for the purpose of advancing religious norms.30 As to the first point:
critics charge that liberals insist on a “naked public square” where people are
not allowed to appeal to their deepest moral and religious convictions.31 This is
not an apt characterization of either political liberalism or of the constitutional
liberalism that James Fleming and I endorse.32 Instead, such forms of
liberalism maintain that citizens may appeal to their religious convictions and
other comprehensive views, but should also attempt to explain how those
religious convictions support political values in terms and arguments that are
accessible to nonbelievers – those who do not share the comprehensive
worldview of the religious person.33
This challenge of accessibility relates to the second point. Greene explains
well why laws should not be expressly grounded in religious convictions:
Although (some) secular as well as religious beliefs may not be provable,
there is nonetheless a difference between expressly grounding law in
premises accessible to citizens as citizens, on the one hand, and only to
those with a particular religious faith, on the other hand. When religious
believers enact laws for the express purpose of advancing norms dictated
by their religion, they exclude nonbelievers from meaningful participation
in political discourse and from meaningful access to the source of
normative authority predicating law. They force their reference out on
others, disempowering nonbelievers. For this reason, it is proper to insist
that law be grounded expressly in sources of normative authority
accessible to citizens as citizens, not merely to those who share faith in a
separate, extrahuman source of normative authority.34
One example of offering an impermissible basis for a law is the statement
made by New York State Senator Reuben Diaz in opposing New York’s
proposed marriage equality law: “[W]e are trying to redefine marriage. . . . I
agree with Archbishop Timothy Dolan when he said that God, not Albany, has
settled the definition of marriage a long time ago.”35 In other words, Senator
29

See GREENE, supra note 1, at 139, 150-51.
Id. at 150-51.
31 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 248-51
(2009).
32 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 183-206.
33 GREENE, supra note 1, at 150-51. For liberal arguments along these lines, see John
Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 783-86 (1997)
(explaining “the proviso”). See also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 13-15 (1996) (explaining the requirement of “reciprocity” as among the
criteria for “substantive moral argument” in politics).
34 GREENE, supra note 1, at 150-51.
35 Sen. Ruben Diaz, Remarks on the Floor of the New York Senate (June 24, 2011)
30
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Diaz believes the New York legislature may not enact a definition of marriage
that conflicts with religious teaching about marriage. It would be interesting to
see how Greene would evaluate Reverend Billy Graham’s “vote biblical
values” campaign, in which he urged voters to “cast our ballots for candidates
who base their decisions on biblical principles” in a series of full-page
newspaper ads shortly before the 2012 presidential election.36 Greene does not
bar lawmakers from voting based on their religious convictions. In fact, he has
“no quarrel with legislators’ or citizens’ relying on their religious beliefs when
they form political positions or decide how to vote (for laws or
representatives).”37 For Greene, the real problem arises when legislators enact
laws primarily to give effect to their religious convictions, resulting in laws
that “appear[] to have been passed because of a sectarian religious concern.”38
Thus, I am assuming that a law designed primarily to, as Graham puts it,
“support the biblical definition of marriage between a man and a woman”39
would violate Greene’s requirement that nonbelievers not be excluded from
“meaningful participation in political discourse” or from “meaningful access to
the source of normative authority predicating law.”40 The Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) is a good test case for Greene’s requirement that a law not
exclude nonbelievers.41 At the core of the recent DOMA litigation were
Congress’s purposes in enacting the law and whether some of them, such as
expressing moral disapproval of homosexuality and promoting traditional
Judeo-Christian moral teaching about marriage, would survive constitutional
scrutiny.42

(transcript available at http://m.nysenate.gov/legislation/transcript/regular-session-06-24-20
11). For a discussion of these remarks, see FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 200.
36 One such advertisement appeared in the print edition of the Wall Street Journal on
October 18, 2012. See Robert Kessler, Billy Graham Bought a Whole Page in the Wall
Street Journal to Tell You What He Thinks About Gays and Women, GAWKER (Oct. 18, 2012,
12:25 PM), http://gawker.com/5952856/billy-graham-bought-a-whole-page-in-the-wallstreet-journal-to-tell-you-what-he-thinks-about-gays-and-women
[hereinafter
Graham
Advertisement] (including a reproduction of the advertisement).
37 GREENE, supra note 1, at 151.
38 Id.
39 Graham Advertisement, supra note 36.
40 GREENE, supra note 1, at 151.
41 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
42 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, No. 12-307, slip op. at 20-21 (U.S. June 26, 2013)
(holding that Section 3 of DOMA violates “basic due process and equal protection
principles” and citing language in House Report 3936 about DOMA’s stated purposes of
expressing “moral disapproval of homosexuality” and defending “traditional heterosexual
marriage” as evidence that DOMA’s “essence” was “interference with the equal dignity of
same-sex marriages”).
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In addition to advocating for “the biblical definition of marriage,” Graham’s
ad urges voters to choose candidates “who protect the sanctity of life.”43 This
dovetails well with another of Greene’s points, namely the extent to which
“biblical principles” of “sanctity” should justify a law barring abortion.44
According to Greene, “it is problematic under the Establishment Clause for
adherents to a religious faith to forbid abortions if the predominant, express
reason is a belief that God condemns abortion.”45 Greene argues that laws must
“have an express secular purpose rather than merely a plausible one.”46 If laws
are premised on “an intertwined set of purposes, some religious and some
secular,” this is “inevitable” and not a sufficient basis to invalidate a law,
unless laws are predominantly based on religious justifications.47
Constitutional precedents on the Establishment Clause support his argument.48
Greene explains this constraint on “legislation based in express,
predominant religious justification” – pursuant to the Establishment Clause –
as one half of the “political balance” of the religion clauses.49 This half he calls
the “gag rule” – the idea that religious people are limited in how they may
participate in the political process.50
The other half of the balance is the Free Exercise Clause.51 Here, Greene
and I share some points of agreement but also diverge in our views of how
frequent and robust exemptions should be. Greene argues:
[W]e should see exemptions as required to compensate religious people
for the obstacle this disability poses to their participation in the
democratic process. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause can be seen as
providing a political counterweight to the Establishment Clause. If the
latter should be read to prevent religious faith from being the
predominant, express justification for law, then the former should be
construed to make religious faith a ground for avoiding the obligations of
law.52
This political balance argument seems to be a variant of the idea that
autonomy means self-rule: we – as citizens of a constitutional democracy –
live according to rules we give ourselves. Conversely, if religious people, due
43

Graham Advertisement, supra note 36.
GREENE, supra note 1, at 151.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 152.
47 Id.
48 See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it
violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being
no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”).
49 GREENE, supra note 1, at 151, 155.
50 Id. at 155.
51 Id.
52 Id.
44
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to a gag rule, are not able to give themselves the laws by which the
government expects them to live, then they should be able, as Greene puts it, to
avoid the obligations of that law. This seems, however, to be a wholesale
retreat from what political liberalism calls the possibility of an overlapping
consensus – that people of differing comprehensive views can reach an
overlapping consensus on principles of justice.53 Instead, Greene’s system
seems to be one in which the religious, in exchange for not imposing their
beliefs on nonbelievers or on members of other religious groups by law, may
opt out of political obligation. This provides a useful transition point to Part II,
in which I elaborate on points on which Greene and I disagree or on which
more information is needed.
II.

POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT OR UNCERTAINTY

My points of disagreement stem, in significant part, from Greene’s
agnosticism about not only “the good” but also “the right.” This contributes to
his plea for humility or modesty about the proper scope of governmental
authority and for a robust accommodation of those who seek to escape the
“clutches” of the state.54 I will argue “against agnosticism” with respect to the
importance of inculcating civic virtues and supporting political values
notwithstanding pluralism. I will question whether the U.S. constitutional order
is really as antifoundationalist as Greene posits. This in turn relates to my
objection that government is not merely one among the many, but should have
special weight in terms of the demands it makes upon us – and the
responsibilities it has to us – as citizens.
A.

Agnosticism as Part of Our Constitutional Order?

In Against Obligation Greene argues that “recognizing sovereignty as
permeable rather than plenary fits with the agnosticism of value that helps
explain much of our constitutional order.”55 He interprets that order as
antifoundationalist because “it insists the repositories of the people’s power be
multiple, regarding both structure (powers) and rights.”56 He makes the
intriguing argument that “[d]oubt as to what’s right is written all over our
constitutional text and history.”57 In support, he refers not only to the division
of power between nation and states (federalism) and the institution of judicial
review (antimajoritarianism), but also to a host of other constitutional features,
including “the prohibition on establishment of religion,” “a strongly enforced
set of political rights,” “recognition of the free exercise of religion[,] and

53
54
55
56
57

See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
See GREENE, supra note 1, at 114-15.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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freedom of both expressive and intimate association.”58 He further states:
“Viewing the people’s sources of normative authority as permeable, as
including both the state’s laws and sources other than the state, fits snugly with
this anti-foundationalist, multiple repositories of power picture.”59
Greene stresses that “much of [his] argument against political and
interpretive obligation is based in keeping front and center agnosticism of
value.”60 Arguments for political obligation that “seek to overcome
disagreement as to the good and the just by seeking common ground and
settlement,” he contends, “do not properly account for sources of normative
authority as plural.”61 They seek, he continues, a “false solace” from
“overcoming difference,” even though difference is “something we can’t get
past.”62 “Doubt about our premises” animates Greene’s proposed balancing
approach to accommodating minority practices “to the extent possible.”63
A common liberal strategy – particularly in political liberalism – is to
distinguish between agreement about “the good,” that is, on the best way to
live, and to say it is possible to reach agreement on “the right,” that is,
principles of political justice, even while disagreeing over “the good.”64
Greene extends his agnosticism to the right as well: a baseline guiding his
approach to accommodation of religion is “doubt [about] whether we (even
comprehensive liberals) have reached the truest or best answers regarding the
just or the good.”65 Recall that the state “must compete with other sources of
normative authority,”66 and public norms, one infers, deserve no more
allegiance than any other kind of norms.
Thus, I believe that I differ with Greene in terms of the weight of public
norms. At several points in the book, however, he declines to take a stand on
certain matters, which makes it hard to be sure about the exact scope of our
disagreement. For example, he takes no stand on whether or not “value
pluralism” is true; it is sufficient that there is “political pluralism.”67 He takes
no stand on “obligations to nonstate sources” – that is, obligations people owe
to the other nomic communities to which they belong.68 Greene states that he
does not agree with all the claims made in the scholarly literature about
pluralism and multiculturalism. It is sufficient that his own view that “the state
58

Id.
Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 121.
64 The political liberalism of John Rawls employs this distinction. See generally RAWLS,
supra note 53, at 173-211.
65 GREENE, supra note 1, at 157.
66 Id. at 21.
67 Id. at 22.
68 Id. at 20.
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must compete with other sources of normative authority” is “consistent” with
“much” of that literature.69 As an example, he quotes Harold Laski’s
“pluralistic conception of society,” within which “‘the state is only one among
many forms of human association.’”70 The state, Laski elaborates, “‘is not
necessarily any more in harmony with the end of society than a church or a
trade-union, or a freemasons’ lodge. They have . . . relations which the state
controls; but that does not make them inferior to the state.’”71
Pertinent to the discussion of where children feature in his pluralistic vision,
Greene is “agnostic” as to “whether the state should ensure that all children
receive at least some education out from under the control of their parents.”72
Elsewhere, he has argued that his theory of multiple repositories of power
would justify banning private schooling lest parents have a monopoly on their
children’s education.73
B.

How Does the Double Balancing Process Work?

The political balance of the religion clauses, Greene contends, is that the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause, which includes religious
accommodations from the law, compensates for the constraints of the
Establishment Clause.74 It is hard to gauge where I disagree with Greene
because his primary point is to make the case for generous accommodation, not
to work out all the details of when to grant such accommodations. He mentions
the use of a balancing test.75 At the outset of chapter two, “Accommodating
Our Plural Obligations,” he argues that we should “seek a nuanced approach to
relaxing the demands of the state, to allowing religious and philosophical and
other sources of normative authority to govern the lives of the state’s subjects
to the fullest extent compatible with the stable operation of government and the
liberty of other persons.”76 He quickly admits that “[h]ow we accommodate
exit with stability and the liberty of others is a difficult task,” but not one we
should scrap.77
What is Greene’s method? He proposes a balancing approach, or, in effect, a
multifactor approach. When, for example, is uniformity necessary and when is
the “liberty of others . . . affected significantly enough to override a claim of
69

Id. at 21.
Id. (quoting HAROLD J. LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (1919)).
71 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting LASKI, supra note 70, at 65).
72 Id. at 158.
73 See Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 477, 489-92 (2000) [hereinafter Greene, Civil Society]; Abner S. Greene, Why
Vouchers Are Unconstitutional and Why They’re Not, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 397, 408 (1999) [hereinafter Greene, Vouchers].
74 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 149-57.
75 Id. at 115.
76 Id.
77 Id.
70
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exemption”?78 It is striking that Greene does not mention the equality of others
as being a reason to override a claim of exemption. A common objection by
religious and other private associations to antidiscrimination laws, enacted to
further free and equal citizenship and equality of opportunity, is that those laws
pursue equality at the expense of religious liberty.79
While discussing “The Problem of Illiberal Groups,”80 Greene briefly
mentions that some exemptions “would raise equality concerns; often (though
not exclusively) these involve matters of gender, of what comprehensive
liberals would consider indefensibly unequal treatment of women and girls.”81
The use of “comprehensive” liberals here is jarring, as if sex equality and
women’s equal citizenship (including formal equality or equal treatment in
law) were not prominent constitutional principles, at least since the 1970s, and
important political values.82 Or as if contemporary family law did not reflect a
gender revolution away from a hierarchical model of husband and wife and
toward gender neutrality and a premise that marriage is an equal partnership.83
Or as if federal civil rights laws, such as Title VII84 and Title IX,85 did not
reflect the convictions that male and female children should have equal
opportunities in education and adult males and females should have equal
opportunity in education and the workplace.
How is the “unequal treatment of women and girls” simply objectionable to
“comprehensive liberals”?86 Of course, it all depends upon what treatment
Greene means. From what laws do these groups seek exemptions? For what
unequal practices do they seek protection? He tells us that at one end of the
spectrum of practices are those to which we should not defer; thus, “we
shouldn’t accept a group’s view that husbands should be permitted to beat their
wives or children, for any reason.”87 Conversely, at the other end, we should
defer to an association’s rules about leadership (presumably, being open only
78

Id. at 124.
See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 146-76.
80
GREENE, supra note 1, at 157.
81 Id.
82 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (“Since Reed, the Court has
repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the
equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because
they are women, full citizenship stature – equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in
and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.” (citing Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971))); MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 60-61.
83 MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 56-61; Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender and Parentage:
Family Law’s Equality Project in Our Empirical Age, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD?
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 237, 237-40 (Linda C. McClain & Daniel
Cere eds., 2013).
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
85 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).
86 GREENE, supra note 1, at 157.
87 Id. at 158.
79
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to men) and provide them opt outs “from antidiscrimination laws.”88
According to Greene, “Harder cases will fall in between.”89
One baseline Greene uses in addressing deference to illiberal persons or
groups is “knowing and voluntary choices (by adults) to adhere to various
sources of normative authority (or perhaps to do so from felt obligation).”90 As
he recognizes, there are lots of tough questions about “what counts as knowing
and voluntary choice by adults to enter and remain within a group.”91 Greene
does not fill in many blanks about those “in-between,” harder cases. Part III
addresses an even tougher problem – the place of children, for whom a premise
of knowing and voluntary choice simply cannot apply.
How would Greene resolve cases where the equality rights of persons not
within the religious group are in evident conflict with the free exercise of the
religious group and its members? How would he analyze the many conflicts
arising today from alleged threats to religious liberty posed by state laws
allowing same-sex couples to marry? Tantalizingly, his book opens by asking
the reader, on page one, to “suppose you’re a government official” who is
“uncertain whether it’s constitutional to deny a same-sex couple a marriage
license.”92 Well, suppose the law of your state now says you must issue that
couple a license, but your religious faith tells you that marriage is only
between one man and one woman. This is exactly the situation of a town clerk
in upstate New York, who has argued that she should be able to hold fast to her
religious convictions and to her job, diverting same-sex couples to her deputy
clerk, who works on a different day.93 She does not seek to flee the public
realm and live only in her nomic community. Instead, she wants to have
religion in the public square to the extent that she can live “free from the
clutches of the state” while being a governmental official – a public
employee.94 What does Greene think about that case?
In my view, the town clerk should not be exempted as a matter of any
constitutional right to free exercise. Nor should she have any general
entitlement to accommodation by her employer. That said, may her public
employer, nonetheless, attempt to accommodate her? Robin Wilson makes a
plausible case for “easy” accommodation when staffing permits it, to the extent
that same-sex couples are not burdened by the accommodation or forced to
confront a clerk that refuses to issue them a license.95 In the New York case,
88

Id.
Id.
90 Id. at 157.
91 Id. at 158.
92 Id. at 1.
93 Thomas Kaplan, Rights Collide as Town Clerk Sidesteps Role in Gay Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at A1.
94 GREENE, supra note 1, at 115.
95 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government
Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 336, 340,
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however, accommodation would place a direct burden on same-sex couples
and treat them in an unequal manner that belies the statutory aims of the
Marriage Equality Act: the head clerk, with state sanction, could deny samesex couples a license and require that they come back and see her deputy clerk
on a different day. In practical effect, this means that unlike opposite-sex
couples, who could get a license at any time during normal business hours,
same-sex couples could only get one at limited times.
The example of the town clerk returns us to the issue of religion in the
public square. This public official is not entitled to have the marriage laws of
New York embody her religious convictions about marriage. Thus, when the
New York legislature enacted the Marriage Equality Act, it drew a sharp
distinction between civil and religious marriage. The legislature’s action
explains why government has an interest in the institution of marriage, as a
civil matter, and how the New York law, with its robust religious exemptions,
recognizes that religion and religious marriage have their own proper,
independent spheres.96 This is consistent with the Establishment Clause part of
the political balance struck by the religion clauses. The clerk, however, does
not want to enforce a state law that does not mirror her religious convictions
about marriage. Is her “compensation,” pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause,
to be that she may opt out of issuing marriage licenses? Elsewhere in his book,
Greene argues in favor of religious communities living separately, according to
their norms, and possessing “certain attributes of state power,” subject to
constitutional constraints.97 What about a public official seeking to abide by
private norms in her public capacity in a way that affects the civil rights of
New York citizens? Should we be agnostic not only about whether marriage
equality is “good,” but also about whether it is “right,” and thus exempt her?98
Or should we side with Governor Cuomo in his instructions to clerks that they
must follow the law and issue marriage licenses or else find another job?99
359 n.258 (2010).
96 The Statement in Support of the Marriage Equality Act explains: “[T]his bill grants
equal access to the government-created legal institution of civil marriage, while leaving the
religious institution of marriage to its own separate, and fully autonomous, sphere.” 2011
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1732, 1734 (McKinney). For further discussion, see FLEMING & MCCLAIN,
supra note 16, at 174, 204-05.
97
GREENE, supra note 1, at 146-48.
98 I will spare Greene the same question about clerical defiance of interracial marriage,
but I should note that, in the 1960s, some people opposed interracial marriage on religious
grounds and denominations themselves struggled over whether to come out against
antimiscegenation laws. See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 172-73.
99 See Kaplan, supra note 93 (quoting Governor Cuomo as saying, “When you enforce
the laws of the state, you don’t get to pick and choose”); see also Memorandum from the
Office of Vital Records to the N.Y. State Town & City Clerks (July 13, 2011), available at
http://site.pfaw.org/pdf/Jordan_Belforti_NY_Marriage.PDF (“No application for a marriage
license shall be denied on the ground that the parties are of the same or a different sex.”).
For further discussion, see FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 16, at 174-75.
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Based on my conversations with – and analysis of the writings by – some
religious conservatives who oppose civil laws allowing same-sex couples to
marry, I have concluded that no set of religious exemptions would satisfy
them. The marriage equality law itself is an affront to these religious citizens.
Moreover, religious conservatives argue that even exemptions for religious
institutions and clergy will not help the ordinary citizen engaged in commerce
who objects to same-sex marriage and does not want to facilitate these
marriages in any way, even by booking same-sex couples a honeymoon flight
at a tourist agency. Religious objectors to marriage equality have made it clear
that they want to win at the level of state law itself. Their view of pluralism is
to let different religions allow same-sex couples to enter into commitment
ceremonies, or even “marriages,” as understood in those religious traditions,
but let civil law reflect their conception of marriage.100 Marriage, they say, is a
“natural institution that predates government”; it is based on “biological” and
“anthropological” truth about the sexes and understood as such in religious
traditions.101 If, however, the state is going to define marriage, then it must
embrace a “true” understanding of marriage and recognize only “true
marriages” – that is, the vision of gender-complementary and conjugal
marriage promulgated by the trio of Robert George, Sherif Girgis, and Ryan
Anderson in a much-circulated law review article, new book, and, most
recently, amicus briefs in the Proposition 8 and DOMA cases before the
Supreme Court last term.102
It would be helpful to know how Greene’s framework would address these
issues. Prominent religious officials and groups, in various declarations,103 ad

100 I base this upon remarks made by Witherspoon Institute leader Matthew Franck at a
panel about marriage in which we participated on May 4, 2012, at Princeton University, as
well as his various writings on marriage. For a recent example of Franck’s contention that
religious exemptions to marriage equality laws have failed to protect religious liberty, see
Matthew J. Franck, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, Fundamentally at Odds,
WITHERSPOON INST. (June 18, 2013), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/06/10393.
101 See Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: What It Is, Why It Matters, and the Consequences
of Redefining It, HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 3 (Mar. 11, 2013), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_medi
a/2013/pdf/bg2775.pdf.
102 See United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 13-14 (U.S. June 26, 2013)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (citing SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE,
WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012), as illustrative of the
“‘traditional’ or ‘conjugal’ view” of marriage); Brief for Robert P. George, Sherif Girgis &
Ryan T. Anderson as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12144, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2013); Brief for Robert P. George, Sherif Girgis & Ryan T.
Anderson as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307,
slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2013); GIRGIS, ANDERSON & GEORGE, supra; SHERIF Girgis, Robert
P. George & Ryan T. Anderson, What Is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245
(2011)..
103 See Robert George, Timothy George & Chuck Colson, The Manhattan Declaration:
A Call to Christian Conscience, MANHATTAN DECLARATION (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.m
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hoc committees,104 and task force reports,105 identify civil law’s opening up of
marriage to same-sex couples as one of the most visible arenas in which
religious liberty is under siege. In addition, they identify other clashes between
society’s evolving protection of the rights of gay men and lesbians and the free
exercise claims of religious groups, such as whether to exempt social service
organizations from placing foster or adoptive children with homosexual single
parents or same-sex couples. Massachusetts’s failure to accommodate Catholic
Charities of Boston, causing the organization to exit the adoption business, is
used as a prominent example in many warnings by religious groups.106 Another
cluster of issues involves health care, contraception, and abortion. How would
these be resolved under Greene’s balancing test or multi-factor approach?
III. CHILDREN
Where do children and their rights, needs, and interests feature in Greene’s
argument “against obligation” and in favor of “multiple sources of authority”?
In his brief section in chapter two on “The Problem of Illiberal Groups,”
Greene notes that some exemptions will “raise equality concerns,” for
example, “what comprehensive liberals would consider indefensibly unequal
treatment of women and girls.”107 He also notes that his baseline of “knowing
and voluntary choices (by adults) to adhere to various sources of normative
authority” does not readily apply to children.108 Nonetheless, many concrete
clashes between state (and federal) laws and claims of religion involve
children. Children also participate in – and are entrusted by their parents to –
many institutions with their own norms and forms of governance. I will first
sketch the place of children in the U.S. constitutional system of divided
authority, highlighting their status as both rights-holders and vulnerable
persons. I will then consider the brief attention Greene does give to children in
his book and raise concerns about how children would fare in Greene’s
framework, discussing an issue he does not: the sexual abuse of children in

anhattandeclaration.org/man_dec_resources/Manhattan_Declaration_full_text.pdf
[hereinafter Manhattan Declaration].
104 See Archbishop William E. Lori, Address at the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops
General Assembly: Address on Religious Liberty (Nov. 14, 2011) (transcript available at htt
p://www.usccb.org/about/leadership/usccb-general-assembly/2011-november-meeting/archb
ishop-lori-religious-liberty-november-2011-address.cfm). Archbishop Lori is the head of the
recently formed U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Ad Hoc Committee for Religious
Liberty. Biography of Bishop William E. Lori, S.T.D., DIOCESE OF BRIDGEPORT, http://www.
bridgeportdiocese.com/index.php/ourbishop (last visited June 10, 2013).
105 See TIMOTHY SAMUEL SHAH ET AL., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: WHY NOW? DEFENDING AN
EMBATTLED HUMAN RIGHT (2012).
106 See id., supra note 105, at 79-80; Manhattan Declaration, supra note 103.
107 GREENE, supra note 1, at 157.
108 Id.
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institutions and the efforts of the state, through mandatory reporting laws, to
protect children from such abuse.
A.

Fractured Authority and the Place of Children

Our constitutional order divides authority over children between their
parents – who have a fundamental liberty to direct their care, education, and
custody – and government, which has an interest, as parens patriae, in the
healthy development of children, including protecting them from harms and
ensuring their chance to develop into persons capable of participating in
democratic self-government. Meyer v. Nebraska,109 Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,110 and Prince v. Massachusetts111 make up the canonical trio on
parental liberty. In Troxel v. Granville112 the Supreme Court invoked this trio
when it affirmed such liberty: “The liberty interest at issue in this case – the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court.”113 Prince does not merely address parental liberty, but also asserts that
the state has a compelling interest in children’s healthy development.114
Moreover, Prince includes the oft-quoted directive: “Parents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.”115
A vivid expression of the state’s interest in the healthy development of
children appears in a dissenting opinion by Justice Rehnquist (joined by
Justices White and O’Connor) in Santosky v. Kramer.116 In Santosky the Court
held that parental rights could not be terminated without satisfying a clear and
convincing evidence standard.117 Explaining that the majority erred in
imposing such a high standard, Rehnquist quotes freely from Prince to
emphasize the strength of the State’s interests:
In addition to the child’s interest in a normal homelife, “the State has an
urgent interest in the welfare of the child.” Few could doubt that the most
valuable resource of a self-governing society is its population of children
who will one day become adults and themselves assume the responsibility
of self-governance. “A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

262 U.S. 390 (1923).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (ruling against the parental liberty claim).
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 65.
Prince, 321 U.S. at 164-65.
Id. at 170.
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Id. at 747-48.
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the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people in to full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies.” Thus, “the whole community” has an
interest “that children be both safeguarded from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free and independent and welldeveloped . . . citizens.”118
Here, the dissenters invoke Prince as an indispensable precedent for the
proposition that the state’s interest in children may sometimes trump parental
liberty and free exercise rights – and even the child’s free exercise rights.
Indeed, it is puzzling that Prince did not lead to a different holding in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,119 especially given Justice Douglas’s concerns over the
impact of keeping a child out of school.120 I concur with Greene, however, that
a key factor in Yoder was Chief Justice Burger’s “recognition of the value of
the separatist Amish nomic community.”121 Indeed, the majority states: “We
must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the civilization of
the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who
isolated themselves from all worldly influences against great obstacles.”122 In
effect, there was a congruence between Amish values and venerated American
values: the Amish parents and community were producing good (read: selfsufficient) citizens,123 and thus the parents’ voluntary separation would not
harm their children. Burger does call for agnosticism and modesty about
whether “today’s majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are
‘wrong,’” stating that “a way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes
with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is
different.”124 The majority is not agnostic, however, about whether the Amish
are a heartening reminder of the worthy yeomen farmers of old, a venerated
part of America’s past.125
This caselaw aptly illustrates the divided authority over children within the
U.S. constitutional order. Moreover, the Court has stated that children
themselves possess constitutional rights, even if the scope of those rights is not
coterminous with the constitutional rights of adults. This adds to what Greene
118

Id. at 790 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981); Prince, 321 U.S. at 165,
168).
119 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish children could not be forced to continue
their formal education beyond eighth grade because their parents’ First Amendment right to
free exercise of religion outweighed the state’s interest in regulating the duration of basic
education).
120 Id. at 241-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that children’s free exercise
claims must also be considered when deciding the free exercise claims of their parents).
121 Greene, supra note 28, at 16.
122 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223-24.
123 Id.
124 Id. Greene also quotes this language in his work. See Greene, supra note 28, at 16.
125 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223-24.
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might call the fracturing of power or authority. Sometimes children’s rights
empower them vis-à-vis government entities, like public schools, where they
have constitutional rights to freedom of speech, subject to certain limits.126 In
other situations children’s rights protect them from the arbitrary or
overweening exercise of governmental power, even under the guise of
benevolent paternalism, as in the context of the juvenile justice system.127
Children’s rights may also empower them vis-à-vis their parents, such as when
a pregnant female adolescent may seek a judicial bypass from a parental
consent or notification law128 or when an adolescent may get certain forms of
medical treatment without parental consent.129
Despite these constitutional rights and certain statutory entitlements,
children are still a highly vulnerable population. They are vulnerable because
they depend on others to meet their basic material, physical, and emotional

126 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
is the high water mark for students’ First Amendment speech rights in school. Declaring that
students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,” the Court upheld students’ freedom of expression in school unless it
substantially disrupts or interferes with the operation of the school or collides with the rights
of others. Id. at 506, 513. Subsequent cases recognized categories or contexts in which
school officials have authority to restrict student speech, even apart from the Tinker
framework. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 406, 410 (2007) (observing that “the rule
of Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech,” and holding that it was
“reasonable” for a school principal to conclude that a student-made banner displayed at a
school-sanctioned activity “promoted illegal drug use – in violation of established school
policy – and that failing to act would send a powerful message to the students in her charge .
. . about how serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use”); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (upholding school authority to exercise
“editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (upholding the
school’s authority to suspend a student for “offensively lewd and indecent speech” during a
high school assembly).
127 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967) (holding that children are entitled to certain
due process protections in juvenile proceedings and observing that “[u]nder our
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court”).
128 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (holding that a state law requiring
parental notice and consent for a minor female’s abortion must give the minor the
opportunity to go directly to court without first consulting or notifying her parents, and if
she satisfies the court she is mature and informed enough to make the decision on her own,
she must be permitted to act without parental consent).
129 Most states treat minors as emancipated – and thus allow them to seek medical
treatment without parental consent – for “health problems that minors might want to conceal
from their parents, and thus might not seek to have treated if parental consent were
required,” such as “drug abuse, alcohol abuse, pregnancy, and venereal disease.” DOUGLAS
E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 717 (4th ed. 2010).
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needs, and the failure of others to provide those needs can impair their healthy
development in many ways. Children also lack formal political representation
and often lack legal representation in many matters affecting their lives. They
are also vulnerable because the legal system entrusts parents, guardians, and
public institutions with enormous power over them. According to Supreme
Court jurisprudence, the premise for this allocation of authority is that parents
possess exactly what children lack and naturally act in the best interests of their
children. As Chief Justice Burger explained in Parham v. J.R.,130 which
affirmed the right of parents to commit their children to mental health
institutions without a pre-commitment hearing:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor
children. . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity
for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.131
In Parham, these posited differences between children and adults served to
empower parents – as well as child protective service officials with no
“natural” bonds of affection to their charges – and to disempower children with
respect to mental health care. In the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
however, these differences between children and adults have weighed in
children’s favor. In a trio of cases, the Court has held that it violates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment to subject minors to the
death penalty,132 to categorical sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide crimes,133 and, most recently, to mandatory life without parole
sentences for homicide crimes.134 The Court’s reasoning stresses the
“diminished culpability of juveniles” due to “[t]hree general differences
between juveniles under 18 and adults”: (1) “‘[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in
adults,’” which “‘often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions’”;135 (2) greater vulnerability and susceptibility to “negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure”;136 and (3) “the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”137 In Miller
the Court explained that Roper and Graham, which “establish[ed] that children
130

442 U.S. 584 (1979).
Id. at 602.
132 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing,” rest “not
only on common sense – on what ‘any parent knows’ – but on science and
social science as well,” including studies of child development and brain
science.138 Pertinent to the question of where children fit in Greene’s scheme
of multiple sources of authority and rights of exit, the Court also observes that
family is among those “negative influences and outside pressures,” and that
children have “limited ‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the
ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing situations.”139
One way to express the fractured – or divided – authority over children is to
say that children are neither the “mere creature[s] of the state” nor simply
creatures of their parents.140 However, they often live subject to multiple
sources of authority. How does Greene’s model address children? In particular,
in seeking the maximum amount of opt outs to accommodate our “plural
obligations,” does his theory take seriously enough the rights, interests, and
needs of children?
The place of children in Greene’s framework is difficult to gauge from just
the analysis included in Against Obligation. My concern is that his theory
would insufficiently protect children. Then again, I have doubts about whether
or not I am correct about this – due not to agnosticism but simply to a lack of
information. I will first discuss the concrete examples Greene offers about the
status of children. I will then turn to an example he does not discuss and ask
how he would resolve it. This example, far from being hypothetical, is all too
real and prevalent: the failure of private and public institutions, despite
mandatory reporting laws, to report and address the sexual abuse of children
within those institutions.
B.

How Do Children Fare in Greene’s System of Accommodating Plural
Obligations?
1.

Cases and Contexts Greene Discusses
a.

Partial Exit

In Against Obligation Greene discusses the Kiryas Joel case141 as posing the
“problem of partial exit,” as well as “a hard question about the limits of

138

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 & n.5 (stating that “the evidence presented to us in these
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139 Id. at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
140 See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
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governmental efforts to aid a small religious group.”142 To give a brief account:
the Satmar Hasidim, a Jewish religious sect, purchased property and
incorporated as the Village of Kiryas Joel.143 This group represents a “partial
exit” case because it “wanted to exist separately and live according to its own
norms and to possess certain attributes of state power.”144 Members of the sect
attempted to send their children with handicaps to local, heterogeneous county
schools, but the children “had a hard time dealing with immersion in the nonSatmar world,”145 and parents withdrew them from the secular schools “citing
‘the panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their own
community and being with people whose ways were so different.’”146 The
Satmars successfully “lobbied the state legislature for a special school
district . . . [to] alleviate the emotional trauma of their handicapped
children.”147 Greene believes that the Supreme Court was wrong to hold the
law unconstitutional as violating the Establishment Clause.148 He counters:
“We should see Kiryas Joel as about a group that wants to live by itself and
operate private institutions and to exercise appropriate public power.”149 Thus,
“so long as the Satmars are willing to abide by constitutional rules when
exercising such power, there should be no constitutional barrier to the state’s
ceding them the public as well as private attributes of sovereignty.”150
In other work Greene elaborates his critique of the Court’s Kiryas Joel
opinion, arguing that the Satmars were not “us[ing] governmental power to
teach religious doctrine in public schools,” which would be unconstitutional.151
Greene further argues that the Satmars were not discriminating “against other
religions in the granting of governmental benefits” – another constitutional
problem under the First Amendment.152 Their school was “formally open
regardless of religion [but] only Hasidic parents chose to send their kids
there.”153
To assess Greene’s model of partial exit, we would need to know more
about how children fare when nomic communities both live apart and “exercise
appropriate public power.”154 Are there, for example, other instances of
142
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religious communities exercising public power that Greene would support?
What are the consequences of this kind of delegation of public power for the
development of children into free and equal citizens capable of participating in
democratic self-government? In his article analyzing Kiryas Joel, Greene
acknowledges:
It might or might not be a good thing for the health of the Republic that
certain groups want to live on their own and simultaneously exercise
governmental power. But so long as such groups exercise governmental
power in a constitutional fashion, our opposition to balkanization should
take a form other than judicial injunctions against separation.155
Much turns on how Greene and others read “in a constitutional fashion” and
whether there is to be any accountability to public authorities for the actual
exercise of this public power. The example of child sexual abuse, as I discuss
below, raises the problem of religious authorities – including those in some
Orthodox Jewish “nomic” communities – discouraging people from availing
themselves of civil law or complying with mandatory reporting laws. Suppose
a religious community sought public authority to address child sexual abuse
within its community?
b.

Education and Illiberal Groups

Greene is agnostic, in Against Obligation, about “whether the state should
ensure that all children receive at least some education out from under the
control of their parents.”156 He would, however, “permit (and encourage) the
state to expose all of its citizens – even those living in illiberal communities –
to liberal views and to options of how to live apart from one’s community.”157
In discussing when illiberal groups should be exempted from laws, Greene
focuses primarily on explaining his “deferential [position] to (even illiberal)
persons/groups desiring to depart from law and live by their own lights.”158
Those “lights,” recall, may “raise equality concerns” because some exemptions
will be sought for practices that “involve matters of gender” that
“comprehensive liberals would consider indefensibly unequal treatment of
women and girls.”159 As I argued above, I find it problematic to assume that
only comprehensive liberals would see warning flags due to unequal treatment.
As discussed in Part II, one of Greene’s baselines is “knowing and voluntary
choices (by adults) to adhere to various sources of normative authority (or
perhaps to do so from felt obligation).”160 He admits the “toughest set of
questions” about his approach concerns “what counts as knowing and
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voluntary choice by adults to enter and remain within a group.”161 Another
baseline is his “agnosticism” about “whether we (even comprehensive liberals)
have reached the truest or best answers regarding the just or the good.”162
Greene would resolve these opt-out and exemption issues with a balancing test:
“We must balance harm caused by practices to which we might defer against
the harm to the (usually) minority person/group if an exemption is denied.”163
As seen in Part II, physical violence is an easy case of no deference.164 But
what about educational choices?
If there are concerns about whether adults have made “voluntary” choices,
these concerns seem magnified in the case of children. The concern increases
dramatically if Greene’s agnosticism leads to a stance that, contrary to the
dual-authority model for children’s education, parents may control their
children’s education entirely. In his previous work, Greene rejected these sorts
of parentalist manifestos because they are contrary to a model of divided or
fractured power and multiple sources of authority.165 Indeed, as he
acknowledges, elsewhere he has advanced the idea that overruling Pierce
would be consistent with a model of multiple repositories of power.166 As he
once explained, it would not be inconsistent with a “commitment to divided
power” to “insist that all children attend public schools,” since parents “would
[still] be able to influence directly an enormous proportion of a child’s time (all
the time not in school) and teachers and children of various walks of life would
be able to influence another, smaller proportion.”167 In another article Greene
argues that overruling Pierce and requiring public schooling ensures “that
children are exposed to multiple sources of value.”168 He also states that while
keeping Pierce may counteract the “public school monopoly,” it also ensures
“that the formal education of children is dictated solely by parental choice.”169
How Greene assesses the comparative harms here is instructive in light of his
subsequent agnosticism: overruling Pierce “harms religions that insist on
nonexposure to competition,” while retaining Pierce “harms the ability of each
child to become an adult who can then choose what sort of religious or secular
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life he or she wishes to lead.”170 The pre-agnostic Greene concludes that “[t]he
anti-foundationalism and multiple repositories of power predicates of our
constitutional order . . . mandate [overruling Pierce].”171
I have elaborated elsewhere on my own approach to education, which
stresses the place of public education (or private education informed by public
norms) in government’s formative project.172 I have also argued that
government should permit but regulate home schooling and, even then, require
that home-schooled children participate in a civic education program in a
public school.173 I would urge Greene not to remain agnostic on whether “the
state should ensure that all children receive at least some education out from
under the control of their parents.”174 Otherwise, children of adults in nomic
communities are the losers in Greene’s multiple sovereignty scheme, since
parental sovereignty no longer seems “permeable,” but “absolute.”175 How,
after all, is the state to “expose” citizens to “liberal views and to options of
how to live apart from one’s community”176 if nomic communities may live
apart and even exercise public authority, for example, over education?
2.

One Case Greene Does Not Discuss: The Relationship Between the
Authority of Government and the Authority of Nomic Communities
Concerning the Abuse of Children

How would Greene analyze how far nomic communities can escape the
“clutches” of the state with respect to state laws designed to protect children
from abuse, particularly sexual abuse? I do not refer here to whether his
scheme would exempt parents and guardians from child abuse and neglect
laws. Of course, Greene does not believe that the freedom of nomic
communities can include the right to physically abuse wives or children.177 As
Marci Hamilton points out, the scope of constitutionally protected religious
liberty does not include – and has never included – “licentiousness” (a term
applied to child sexual abuse); thus, the sexual abuse practices that sometimes
take place in religious organizations “are not [typically] supported by the
religious beliefs of these organizations.”178 I ask instead how Greene’s
170
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argument against a general obligation to obey the law and in favor of
maximum accommodation of nomic communities would evaluate the problem.
How would it address the fact that children suffer forms of physical abuse,
particularly sexual abuse, within institutions to which parents frequently
entrust their children? How would it address the fact that those institutions
ignore mandatory reporting laws, conceal the abuse, and fail to protect
children? Examples abound involving religious institutions like the Catholic
Church, youth organizations like the Boy Scouts of America, and public and
private educational institutions, including colleges, universities, and related
programs.
Child protection laws raise two questions for Greene’s model of permeable
sovereignty and his agnosticism. First, what if these nomic communities argue
that they should be exempt from reporting laws because they have their own
internal processes – “laws” – concerning how to deal with suspected sexual
abuse of children by their members? Suppose they argue for an entitlement to
exercise public authority in these matters. Second, suppose that these
institutions do not formally seek exemption from reporting laws but instead
simply do not obey them, and do not feel bound to obey them. The reasons for
this lack of obedience and compliance could be manifold, including
institutional self-interest and self-protection. Secrecy and concealment help
avoid tarnishing an institution’s reputation and bad publicity, which Marci
Hamilton documents as “the rules against scandal.”179 Another reason could be
that the institution believes its own internal processes are preferable, or that
suspected child abusers should be forgiven and given a second chance rather
than turned over to public authorities.180 Whatever the reason, noncompliance
poses serious risks for the victims of child abuse, including a lack of
institutional accountability, a failure to protect present and future victims, and
a lack of empathy for the victims themselves.
As I was reading Greene’s book and organizing my response to it, I was
struck by two front-page stories in the New York Times on June 23, 2012:
Cardinal’s Aide Is Found Guilty in Abuse Case181 and Sandusky Guilty of
Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys.182 Underlying each of these stories is a lack of
accountability for child sexual abuse by institutional actors. I discuss these
examples because they highlight the issues of trust and the abuse of trust in

RTS. J. 953, 956 (2010). Hamilton argues that fundamentalist polygamists are the exception
in that they do appeal to religious scriptures and beliefs. Id. at 957.
179 Marci A. Hamilton, The Rules Against Scandal and What They Mean for the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 69 MD. L. REV. 115 (2009) (explaining how the principle of
internal secrecy (the “scandal rule”) runs across religious entities).
180 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a.
181 Jon Hurdle & Erik Eckholm, Cardinal’s Aide Is Found Guilty in Abuse Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2012, at A1.
182 Joe Drape, Sandusky Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2012, at A1.
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non-state and educational institutions. They also illustrate the vulnerability of
children to abuse within these institutions due to institutional culture and
noncompliance with civil laws designed to protect children.
a.

Child Sex Abuse in the U.S. Roman Catholic Church

The first headline concerns the criminal conviction of Monsignor William J.
Lynn, of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, for child endangerment. This is
reportedly the first time a “senior official of the Roman Catholic Church in the
United States” has been “convicted of covering up sexual abuses by priests
under his supervision.”183 As secretary for the clergy of the 1.5-millionmember archdiocese from 1992 to 2004, Lynn’s duties included
recommending priest assignments and investigating abuse complaints.184 The
New York Times story reported that “[p]rosecutors presented a flood of
evidence that Monsignor Lynn had not acted strongly to keep suspected
molesters away from children, let alone to report them to law enforcement.”185
The District Attorney in the case stated that the verdict had sent a message to
the nation: “This monumental case will change the way business is done in
many institutions.”186
Why did this senior official within the nomic community of the Catholic
Church believe he did not have to report suspected child abuse? For example,
one critical piece of evidence in the case was a list Lynn made in 1994 of three
dozen active priests who had been credibly accused of sex abuse.187 Lynn let
one priest live in a parish rectory even after a medical recommendation that he
should be kept away from children.188
The numerous lawsuits brought against the Catholic Church for alleged sex
abuse by priests are familiar.189 The Catholic Church has reportedly paid
“more than $2 billion in abuse settlements in the United States alone in the past
decade.”190 To be clear, problems of sexual abuse of children by clergy are not
unique to the Catholic Church.191 Hamilton has studied this general problem
extensively, including the reasons for institutional cover-ups of such abuse.192
She argues that in the various religious communities where there has been
183
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sexual abuse and then “furthering [of] the abuse through hierarchical coverup,” one can find “an acknowledged rule (or theological principle) that forbade
the airing of dirty laundry to outsiders.”193 She refers to this as a rule against
“scandal.”194 She offers a historical example of a 1962 document in the Roman
Catholic Church detailing a secret procedure for handling sexual offenses and
threatening excommunication for those who broke their silence.195 Hamilton
observes that in the 1980s, “an internal report was offered to the U.S. Catholic
Bishops that cast the phenomenon of clergy abuse in terms of an epidemic of
clergy abuse cases waiting to explode.”196 However, “the perceived need for
silence led the church to pretend publicly that it harbored no pedophiles, so
that across the country cardinals, archbishops, and bishops shuffled known
pedophiles from parish to parish without notice to anyone, leaving behind a
trail of young victims.”197 In 2002 a team of investigative reporters broke the
Pulitzer Prize-winning story of the role of the Boston Archdiocese in the
hierarchical cover up of child sexual abuse and the “persistent transfer of
pedophile priests by bishops.”198 The reporters characterized their story as one
of “a large number of Catholic priests who abused both the trust given them
and the children in their care.”199 As Hamilton puts it:
While there had been trickles of information to the public before then, it
was not until the larger picture of the Catholic hierarchy’s handling of
abuse that the public started to comprehend that its practices were
uniform across dioceses, and even other countries, and then that such
practices were not peculiar to the Catholic Church.200
This public disclosure triggered several institutional responses by the
Catholic Church in the United States. One response was that the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) tasked a National Review Board to
193
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help the USCCB “police themselves” in the sex abuse crisis.201 The National
Review Board commissioned a “descriptive study of the nature and scope of
sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy in the United States.”202 In 2002 the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops adopted a “Charter for the Protection
of Children and Young People,” entitled “Promise to Protect, Pledge to Heal,”
which was approved by the full body of U.S. Catholic Bishops in June 2005.203
The preamble to the Charter begins by noting institutional failure, using the
dual language of sin and crime:
Since 2002, the Church in the United States has experienced a crisis
without precedent in our times. The sexual abuse of children and young
people by some deacons, priests, and bishops, and the ways in which
these crimes and sins were addressed, have caused enormous pain, anger,
and confusion. As bishops, we have acknowledged our mistakes and our
roles in that suffering, and we apologize and take responsibility again for
too often failing victims and the Catholic people in the past. . . .
. . . We have agonized over the sinfulness, the criminality, and the breach
of trust perpetrated by some members of the clergy. . . .
. . . The loss of trust that is often the consequence of such abuse becomes
even more tragic when it leads to a loss of the faith that we have a sacred
duty to foster. We make our own the words of His Holiness, Pope John
Paul II: that the sexual abuse of young people is “by every standard
wrong and rightly considered a crime by society; it is also an appalling
sin in the eyes of God.”204
The Charter announced a zero-tolerance policy. In speaking about sin and
crime, it acknowledged the proper role of civil authorities to address child
sexual abuse, even as it spoke about “healing and reconciliation” with regard to
the victims of the abuse.205 In effect, the Charter speaks a dual language: the
Church’s “first obligation” is to help the victims of sexual abuse find healing,
repair the breach of trust, and promote reconciliation within the religious
community.206 The Charter also committed dioceses to adopting “policies and
procedures . . . to respond promptly to any allegation where there is reason to

201 A U.S. Catholic Interview, We Can Do Better: Responding to Sex Abuse 10 Years
Later, U.S. CATH., June 2012, at 18, 18, available at http://www.uscatholic.org/church/2012
/06/we-can-do-better-responding-sex-abuse-10-years-later [hereinafter, We Can Do Better].
202 U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PROMISE TO PROTECT, PLEDGE TO HEAL:
CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 7 (rev. ed. 2011).
203 This information appears on the copyright page of the USCCB Charter. Id. A second
revision of the Charter was approved in June 2011. Id.
204 Id. at 3-4 (quoting Pope John Paul II, Address to the Cardinals of the United States
and Conference Officers (Apr. 23, 2002)).
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believe that sexual abuse of a minor has occurred.”207 Significantly,
“[d]ioceses/eparchies are to report an allegation of sexual abuse of a person
who is a minor to the public authorities” and are “to comply with all applicable
civil laws with respect to the reporting of allegations of sexual abuse of minors
to civil authorities and cooperate in their investigation in accord with the law
of the jurisdiction in question.”208 Dioceses and eparchies are also “to advise
victims of their right to make a report to public authorities and support this
right.”209
The Charter also commits to internal procedures to remove priests accused
of sexual abuse from ministry. First, it states that “[s]exual abuse of a minor by
a cleric is a crime in the universal law of the Church,” in addition to being “a
crime in all civil jurisdictions in the United States.”210 Henceforth, even a
single act of sexual abuse of a minor “which is admitted or established after an
appropriate process in accord with canon law” should result in an offending
priest or deacon being “permanently removed from ministry and, if warranted,
dismissed from the clerical state.”211 Reflecting the dual track of crime and sin,
of accountability and of healing, the Charter states that “an offending priest or
deacon is to be offered therapeutic professional assistance both for purposes of
prevention and also for his own healing and well-being.”212
To ensure “the accountability” of the USCCB’s procedures, the Charter
renewed the “mandate” of the Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual Abuse, giving it
the status of a “standing committee” of the USCCB charged with advising the
USCCB on “all matters relating to child and youth protection.”213 Notably, the
Charter calls for annual public reporting on “the progress made in
implementing and maintaining the standards in this Charter,” including the
names of dioceses and eparchies not in compliance with the Charter.214
Finally, to advance the goal of child protection, the Charter envisions
cooperation with “parents, civil authorities, educators, and community
organizations to provide education and training for children, youth, parents,
ministers, educators, volunteers, and others about ways to make and maintain a
safe environment for children and young people.”215 Here, instead of insulating
the Church from the state, the Charter calls for collaboration and cooperation,
including utilizing “the resources of law enforcement and other community
207
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agencies” to evaluate the background of all personnel “whose duties include
ongoing, unsupervised contact with minors.”216
Despite the Charter’s aims, the Catholic Church in the United States and
abroad continues to face lawsuits for failing to protect children against sexual
abuse. In 2010, in the face of accusations that it had covered up abuse and
obstructed justice, the Vatican published its procedures for handling sex abuse
cases.217 That policy “spelled out for the first time that [the Vatican] now
strongly urges bishops to report abuse cases to civil authorities if required by
local law.”218 In a striking comment, when asked how bishops would know
they were expected to report abuse to civil authorities if canon law did not
specify it, the Vatican spokesman, Reverend Federico Lombardi, replied:
“Because they’re citizens of a state.”219 Lombardi “conceded,” however, that
such reporting had not always happened.220
Why had it not happened? Lombardi’s answer, after all, seems to suggest
that Catholic officials – as citizens of a state – should know of their legal
obligations and should obey the law. Why did this nomic community resist the
“clutches” of the state with respect to state laws aimed at protecting children?
Why did it believe that its sovereignty entailed an entitlement to follow its own
procedures and not to involve the authority of the state? I am confident that,
given this example, Greene would not embrace this rejection of child
protection law as a good example of a nomic community living by its own
laws and exiting from civil laws. Even so, this example illustrates the risks of a
view that the state is simply one more source of authority among others and
that it must compete with other sources for citizens’ loyalty and allegiance.
Instructive on this issue is a U.S. Catholic interview with Nicholas Cafardi,
a charter member of the National Review Board, tasked with assisting the
USCCB in addressing the sex-abuse crisis.221 The interview took place in
2012, ten years after the “height of the sex abuse crisis” in 2002 and the year
the Bishops adopted the Charter.222 The interviewer poses questions that
highlight clashes between the different value systems of nomic communities
and civil law: “Did bishops look at sex abuse through the lens of sinfulness
rather than law and negligence?”223 Yes, Cafardi answers: “I think most
bishops saw it as a sin, and sin in our church gets forgiven. Other aspects
weren’t always part of the analysis.”224 Cafardi explains what church officials
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did instead of following mandatory reporting laws and reporting suspected
abuse to public authorities:
When the National Review Board saw the reports from other dioceses,
we learned that a priest accused of abuse would come in and tell the
bishop, “I’m sorry, it’ll never happen again.” And since we are a church
that believes in forgiveness and redemption, that sometimes carried the
day.
In the early days a priest-abuser got sent away for a 30-day retreat; then
he would be back on the job in another part of the diocese where nobody
knew him.
At least later on they started sending them to treatment. So even though
I criticize the therapeutic approach, and rightly I think, it actually was an
improvement on what had been done before.225
There was a clash between the Catholic Church’s view of sex abuse –
informed by notions of sin, forgiveness, and redemption – and the public
authorities’ view of it. To some leaders within the Catholic Church,
reassigning a priest and keeping silent about the suspected abuse was a chance
at redemption, not deliberate endangerment of children. Of course, Greene’s
theory balances harms, and I assume it would not permit exemptions when
they harm not only the liberty but also the bodily integrity and wellbeing of
others. Here, vulnerable children are at risk. Why was this religious
community – this sovereign with its own norms and powers – seemingly
indifferent to the actual and potential harm to children if a priest was not
removed from active ministry and reported to public authorities?
Hamilton might argue that the “rule against scandal” offers one answer.226
Cafardi suggests some other factors. For instance, “Rome originally saw this as
an American problem,” as Anglo Saxons “overreact[ing] to sexual issues.”227
Cafardi explains that this was true, but in a different way. It was not that the
problem manifested in America first because of sexual “prudery,” but because
in civil law systems, it is hard “to sue somebody for a wrongful act,” while the
U.S. legal system allows suits to remedy harms.228
The 2002 Charter, Cafardi observes, instantiated a new set of norms,
including “the obligation to report to civil authorities as soon as you know
about an accusation” and to remove a priest from the ministry upon credible
evidence of abuse and permanently upon the establishment of guilt.229
225
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Hamilton, supra note 179, at 122 (discussing how a “principle of internal secrecy”
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227 We Can Do Better, supra note 201.
228 Id.
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The Charter replaces the old model of sin and forgiveness, pursued at the
expense of children, with a model of new norms of accountability and child
protection. The Charter retains a religious framework of sin, healing, and
reconciliation even as it acknowledges the proper role of civil authority and
mandatory reporting. Cafardi himself uses a religious framework to explain
why the emphasis upon child protection and removal from the ministry is
justified:
[O]ur theology says that a priest functions as an icon of Christ. If through
his sexual abuse of a child he has so disfigured the Christ icon, I don’t see
how you get that back. If you lose the ability to be an icon of Christ
through something you’ve done, then I don’t see how you haven’t also
lost the ability to function as a priest.230
I contend that a model of competing sovereigns in which the state’s norms
and values – such as child protection – hold no special weight is not up to the
task of addressing the problem of the sexual abuse of children on the massive
scale on which that abuse evidently occurs. The steps the USCCB has taken to
address the problem include making the Church more accountable and
recognizing the obligation to comply with civil law, not seeking exemptions
from such law.
b.

Child Sex Abuse at Penn State

The second news story is about Penn State’s failure to comply with
mandatory reporting laws and the reasons for that failure. The New York Times
reported the criminal conviction of Jerry Sandusky, a “onetime local hero” and
former Penn State assistant football coach, for rape and sodomy of young boys,
all from “disadvantaged homes.”231 These boys were in the proximity of
Sandusky due to his charity, The Second Mile, founded to work with troubled
youths.232 Sandusky used “his access to the university’s vaunted football
program” and “befriended” and “violated” the children.233 The criminal
charges brought against Sandusky rocked Penn State, leading to criminal and
perjury charges against the athletic director and university official who
oversaw the university police, the dismissal of the university’s longtime
president, and the firing of famed Head Coach Joe Paterno.234
One reason the scandal shook the institution was Penn State’s complicity in
doing nothing about Sandusky even when prominent officials within the
university had reason to know about his sexual abuse of young boys, including
priest’s stipend”; they are to be monitored to make sure they have no contact with children.
Id. Cafardi observes that “[t]he problem is that the church is not good at monitoring people
or running a prison system for priest abusers.” Id.
230 Id.
231 Drape, supra note 182.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.

2013]

AGAINST AGNOSTICISM

1353

incidents on the Penn State campus.235 Just a few weeks after the accusations
against Sandusky became public, another front-page story detailed the
university’s failures in this respect.236 The trigger for the story was the report
by the Special Investigative Counsel, the law firm of former FBI Director
Louis J. Freeh.237 The Special Investigative Counsel was hired by the Penn
State trustees to investigate the university’s actions with respect to Sandusky’s
crimes.238 As the news story put it, the report detailed failures “all the way up
the university’s chain of command – shortcomings that were the result of an
insular and complacent culture in which football was revered, rules were not
applied and the balance of power was dangerously out of whack.”239 I
emphasize these terms because I want to reflect on what Greene might say
about Penn State as a nomic community. Granted, Penn State is a public
institution, but my point here goes to how the institution – and the football
program in particular – experiences itself as possessing purposes, values, and
norms. Indeed, in this Symposium, my colleague Jay Wexler raises the
question of whether devotion to a sport could be a “religion” under Greene’s
scheme.240
I turn now from media coverage of the institutional problems at Penn State
to the Report of the Special Investigative Counsel (the Freeh Report). Why did
checking functions within Penn State not work in this case? Why did Penn
State officials not comply with applicable federal and state child sexual abuse
reporting requirements? For example, the federal Clery Act – enacted in 1990
and named for Jeanne Clery, a student who was raped and murdered in her
dorm room at Lehigh University in 1986241 – requires Penn State “to collect
crime statistics relating to designated crimes, including sexual offenses,
occurring on University property, make timely warnings of certain crimes that
pose an ongoing threat to the community, and prepare an annual safety report
and distribute it to the campus community.”242 The Act also “requires ‘Campus
Security Authorities,’ including coaches and athletic directors, to report crimes
235

Id.
Richard Pérez-Peña, In Report, Failures Throughout Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/sports/ncaafootball/in-freeh-report-on-sandusky
-failures-throughout-penn-state.html?ref=richardperezpena. I discuss the report itself infra.
237 FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL
REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (2012) [hereinafter FREEH REPORT],
available at http://progress.psu.edu/the-freeh-report.
238 Id.
239 Pérez-Peña, supra note 236 (emphasis added).
240 Jay Wexler, Some Thoughts on the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses and Abner
Greene’s Against Obligation, with Reference to Patton Oswalt’s Character “Paul from
Staten Island” in the Film Big Fan, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1363 (2013).
241 Nina Bernstein, On Campus, A Law Enforcement System to Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2011, at A1; Pérez-Peña, supra note 236.
242 FREEH REPORT, supra note 237, at 110.
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to police.”243 As the report explains, the purpose of the Act, which applies to
any institution of higher learning that “participates in federal student financial
aid programs,” is “to provide an Institution’s students, parents and employees
with information about campus safety so that members of the campus
community can make informed decisions to protect themselves from crime.”244
Despite Penn State’s clear obligations under the Clery Act, the Freeh Report
found that “from approximately 1991 until 2007, university officials delegated
Clery Act compliance to the University Police Department’s Crime Prevention
Officer (‘CPO’) . . . [who] was not provided any formal training before taking
over the position . . . [and does not] recall receiving any Clery Act training
until 2007.”245 Even after 2007, when the director of the university police
department transferred “Clery Act compliance responsibility . . . to a
departmental sergeant and instituted some Clery Act training programs[,] . . .
awareness and interest in Clery Act compliance throughout the University
remain[ed] significantly lacking.”246 When Sandusky was arrested in
November 2011, “the University’s Clery Act policy was still in draft form and
had not been implemented,” with many employees “unaware that they were
required to report incidents” and with “little, if any, training.”247 This was so
despite the fact that in 2009 university administrators “identified compliance
with laws and regulations as one of the top 10 risks to the University” that
year.248 As applied to Sandusky’s crimes, three people at Penn State were
“obligated to report the 2001 Sandusky incident to the University Police
Department.”249 This incident involved Assistant Coach Mike McQueary, who
observed Sandusky with a young boy in the shower in conduct that was
“extremely sexual in nature” and “way over the lines.”250 The three people
with reporting obligations were McQueary, Head Coach Joe Paterno, to whom
McQueary described the incident, and Athletic Director Timothy M. Curley,
with whom McQueary later met and told that he “thought that some kind of
intercourse was going on.”251 The report also found fault with President
Graham D. Spanier and Senior Vice President for Finance and Business Gary
C. Schultz, who both knew of the 2001 incident. While Spanier and Schultz
were technically not “Campus Security Authorities” under the Clery Act, given
their “leadership positions” at the university, they “should have ensured” the
university’s compliance with regard to the 2001 incident.252
243
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The Freeh Report further found that officials at Penn State failed to comply
with Pennsylvania law requiring “individuals who are ‘mandatory reporters’ to
report suspected child abuse to the appropriate state agency.”253 Indeed, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged Curley and Schultz with violating
that mandatory reporting law.254
Why did Penn State’s athletic program officials and even its vice president
and president consider themselves beyond the reach of state criminal law? Did
they think their shared sense of purpose – a winning football program –
justified silence about Sandusky’s abuse of power? Did they believe their
shared purpose justified a lack of accountability? Surely they did not think the
sexual abuse was justified; if not, then why did they consider themselves free
to elude the “clutches of the state” in terms of cooperating with mechanisms
designed to protect children and adolescents? The whole premise behind
mandatory reporting is child protection. The failure by Penn State officials to
report the 2001 shower incident and other possible abuse, according to the
Pennsylvania attorney general and the state police commissioner, put
“countless more children at risk of being abused by Jerry Sandusky.”255 Did
these leaders within Penn State think they had no general obligation to obey
Pennsylvania law because they knew better how to handle things? What sort of
reasoning process should they have followed in sorting out their conflicting
loyalties?
What answers does the Freeh Report provide to these questions? In its
concluding section, with recommendations for university governance and
protection of children in university facilities and programs, the Freeh Report
states that the failure of prominent officers at Penn State to “protect children by
allowing Gerald A. Sandusky . . . unrestricted and uncontrolled access to
Pennsylvania State University . . . reveals numerous individual failings, but it
also reveals weaknesses of the University’s culture, governance,
administration, and compliance policies and procedures for protecting
children.”256 I highlight “culture” in this conclusion because the Freeh Report
identifies “[o]ne of the most challenging tasks” the Penn State community
faces as conducting “an open, honest, and thorough examination of the culture
253

Id. at 117.
Id. The Freeh Report quotes the “relevant provision” of the law in effect in 2001 and
also quotes the law as amended in 2011. Id. at 117. The section in effect in 2001 stated:
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255 Pete Thamel, ‘Nothing Changed, Nothing Stopped,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at
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that underlies the failure of Penn State’s most powerful leaders to respond
appropriately to Sandusky’s crimes.”257 What is that “Penn State culture”?258
Specifically, the university should take actions “to create a values- and ethicscentered community where everyone is engaged in placing the needs of
children above the needs of adults” and in creating “an environment where
everyone who sees or suspects child abuse will feel empowered to report the
abuse.”259 The Freeh Report refers to “an over-emphasis on ‘The Penn State
Way’ as an approach to decision-making, a resistance to seeking outside
perspectives, and an excessive focus on athletics that can, if not recognized,
negatively impact the University’s reputation as a progressive institution.”260
The Freeh Report concludes that “the lack of emphasis on values and ethicsbased action created an environment in which Spanier, Schultz, Paterno, and
Curley were able to make decisions to avoid the consequences of bad
publicity.”261 It further states that “[f]or the past several decades, the
University’s Athletic Department was permitted to become a closed
community,” and was “perceived by many in the Penn State Community as ‘an
island,’ where staff members lived by their own rules.”262 The report identified
this “avoidance of the consequences of bad publicity . . . [as] the most
significant, but not the only, cause for this failure to protect child victims and
report to authorities.”263 It also identified a “striking lack of empathy for child
abuse victims by the most senior leaders of the University.”264 Indeed, the
Freeh Report states that the “the most saddening finding” in its investigation is
“the total and consistent disregard by the most senior leaders at Penn State for
the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s child victims,” including “failing to
inquire as to their safety and well-being.”265
Even though Penn State is a public institution, I argue that what this scandal
reveals about the risks of “exit” or “opting out,” as it were, from ethical norms
and values, as well as from state and federal laws, is both instructive and
sobering. That sort of lack of accountability worries me when considering
rhetoric about nomic communities having no general obligation to obey laws.
Lest readers dismiss the Penn State example as “extreme” and thus not
particularly probative, consider that the Penn State scandal triggered extensive
news reporting on the existence of a “parallel judicial universe . . . at many of
the country’s colleges and universities” with a history of favoring athletes.266
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One article noted that “many serious offenses reach neither campus police
officers nor their off-campus counterparts because they are directly funneled to
administrators,” who have various ways of “squelching” the reports.267 In these
cases, the victims are not children but college students, usually young women,
who allege they have been sexually harassed or sexually assaulted by other
students, usually young men. As an officer of one “watchdog” organization,
Security on Campus, expresses the problem: “There exists a culture of
entitlement for athletes on teams . . . I’m certain it’s a culture that doesn’t only
exist at Penn State.”268
In addition to the Clery Act, colleges and universities also have obligations
under Title IX, such as preventing the creation of a “hostile environment” for
accusers.269 Do they honor these obligations? Since I am focusing on child
sexual abuse, it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the more general
problem of how colleges and universities handle reports of sexual assaults
brought by students concerning other students. If recent lawsuits against
colleges and universities are any indication, however, there is ample reason to
believe that analogs to “rules against scandal” and a lack of sympathy for
victims play a part in noncompliance with federal laws and inadequate campus
judicial processes.270
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officials pressured the former dean to underreport the number of sexual assault cases on
campus. Id. One student, Landen Gambill, faces expulsion for speaking publicly (without
naming her rapist) about her frustrating experience with UNC’s campus judicial process, a
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DAILY BEAST (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/02/28/expelled-f
or-speaking-out-about-rape.html. As this Article goes to publication, students at Swarthmore
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Child Sex Abuse in Other Nomic Communities

I could add other examples of institutions – nomic communities – content to
live by their own “laws” and to treat problems of child abuse secretly until
spurred to do otherwise by highly publicized incidents of abuse of children. As
I worked on this Article, the Boy Scouts of America (BSA)271 released the socalled “perversion files.”272 These files, released pursuant to an order of
Oregon’s highest court after attorneys for a boy won an $18.25 million award
against the BSA in 2010, consist of 20,000 pages involving allegations of child
sexual abuse from 1965 to 1985.273 The files include “thousands of incidents of
both alleged and confessed sexual abuse,” revealing a cover-up by leaders
within the BSA.274 Some of this cover-up seems to be in violation of
mandatory reporting laws.275 Similar to the Catholic Church and Penn State
examples, the secrecy surrounding the abuse and the failure by officials within
the BSA to take action against sex offenders put additional children at risk.
Concerns for institutional reputation and compassion for the accused – even to
the point of writing letters of recommendation for future work – also seem to
have resulted in allowing the accused to resign without any public scandal or
reporting to public authorities.276 Since 2010 the Scouts have required
members “to report even suspicion of abuse directly to their local
authorities.”277 Like Penn State and the Catholic Church, the BSA
commissioned an independent review.278 In an “Open Letter to the Scouting
Community,” BSA’s highest officers indicated that the review shows that,
although the BSA system of screening volunteers “functions to help protect

271 Until recently, the BSA barred homosexuals from being scouts or leaders because of
its creed of being “clean” and “morally straight.” Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 530 U.S.
640, 650 (2000). The organization has since announced an end to this longtime ban as to
openly gay youths, to take effect in January 2014. See Erick Eckholm, Boy Scouts End
Longtime Ban on Openly Gay Youths, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/05/24/us/boy-scouts-to-admit-openly-gay-youths-as-members.html?_r=0. It has not,
however, changed its policy with respect to adult members and leaders. Id.
272 Gloria Goodale, Boy Scouts Child Abuse Files: Can the Organization Withstand Their
Release?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justic
e/2012/1018/Boy-Scouts-child-abuse-files-Can-the-organization-withstand-their-releasevideo (discussing the release of the BSA’s files on child sex abuse).
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Kim Christensen & Jason Felch, Boy Scouts Helped Alleged Molesters Cover Tracks,
Files Show, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/16/local/la-me
-boy-scouts-files-20120916.
276 Id.
277 Id. (quoting BSA spokesman Deron Smith).
278 See Wayne Perry et al., An Open Letter to the Scouting Community, BOY SCOUTS AM.
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.scouting.org/sitecore/content/BSAYouthProtection/BSA_Com
munications/IVLetter.aspx.
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Scouts[,] . . . in some instances we failed to defend Scouts from those who
would do harm.”279 Similar to the USCCB Charter, the BSA Open Letter
apologizes to victims and families for the organization’s “fail[ure] to protect,”
admitting that, where some “misused their positions in Scouting to abuse
children . . . in certain cases, our response to these incidents and our efforts to
protect youth were plainly insufficient, inappropriate, or wrong.”280
Greene discusses an agnosticism about values and allowing value
competition among groups (nomic or normative communities), and between
groups and the state. Here there is a glaring gap between the values that attract
people to a particular normative community and the values reflected in the
failure to protect children from abuse within that community. “What values
does this teach our kids, or anyone else for that matter?,” one commentator
asks, particularly when the institution doing the cover up “claims to be one of
the nation’s most prominent values-based organizations?”281 Indeed, the BSA
enjoys a Congressional charter.282
Since Greene discusses an insular Orthodox Jewish community, the Satmar
Hasadim, I will close with one final example of the possible risks of arguing
against obligation and in favor of maximum protection of competing sources of
authority. The example is how the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in
Brooklyn handles sexual abuses cases and the possible complicity of the local
prosecutor. In May 2012 the New York Times reported:
[A]n influential rabbi came last summer to the Brooklyn district attorney,
Charles J. Hynes, with a message: his ultra-Orthodox advocacy group
was instructing adherent Jews that they could report allegations of child
sexual abuse to district attorneys or the police only if a rabbi first
determined that the suspicions were credible.283
According to the reporters, although “the pronouncement was a blunt challenge
to Mr. Hynes’s authority” – and might violate New York’s reporting laws – the
rabbi, Chaim David Zwiebel, “recalled” that Hynes “expressed no opposition
or objection.”284 In a perfect illustration of permeable sovereignty, “[m]any of
the rabbis consider sexual abuse accusations to be community matters best
handled by rabbinical authorities, who often do not report their conclusions to
the police.”285 Reflecting the “rule of scandal” Hamilton finds in many
religions, the reporters note that “[i]nforming on a fellow Jew to a secular
authority is traditionally seen as a grave sin, and victims who do come forward
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can face intense communal intimidation to drop their cases.”286 Hamilton notes
that in the Orthodox community, the rule is “referred to as ‘chilul hashem,’
which literally means ‘desecration of God’s name,’ and is deployed to prohibit
giving the community a bad name through revelations about inappropriate bad
behavior within the organization.”287 Perhaps for this reason, until recently,
Mr. Hynes’s sex crimes unit had few cases involving ultra-Orthodox Jews,
“though experts said the rate of sexual abuse in these communities was
believed to occur at the same rate as in society over all.”288 Although Hynes’s
office credits his efforts to reach out to ultra-Orthodox victims of child sexual
abuse289 as leading to “an effective crackdown on child sexual abuse among
ultra-Orthodox Jews” and many arrests, critics point out that his office still
treats the ultra-Orthodox differently by not publicizing the names of
defendants.290
This news story triggered predictable reactions, including Mayor Bloomberg
making clear that “‘[a]ny abuse allegations should be brought to law
enforcement, who are trained to assess their accuracy and act
appropriately.’”291 Nonetheless, contrary to New York law requiring teachers,
counselors, and others to report allegations immediately to authorities, Rabbi
Zwiebel countered that even a teacher should first go to a rabbi: “‘The rabbis’
consensus is go to a rabbi, because of the stringency of the matter on both sides
of the equation, both the Jewish legal implications and because you can destroy
a person’s life with a false report.’”292 Suggestive of the type of pressure
people within the ultra-Orthodox community face in raising child sexual abuse
claims, Hynes announced he was “setting up a panel of prosecutors and
investigators to crack down on witness intimidation in child sexual abuse cases
in the borough’s ultra-Orthodox Jewish community”293 and asking the panel to
“‘come up with some alternatives to break down this wall of intimidation.’”294
Indeed, he remarked:
“The level of intimidation is not found nearly as much in organized crime
. . . . It’s extraordinary just how relentless these people can be. There is no
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concern for the victim in parts of these communities . . . . Everything is
for the abuser, and that’s the horrible thing that we have to deal with.”295
These various highly publicized instances of institutions failing to protect
children by not taking seriously their own obligation to follow state law have
triggered a spate of new proposed state laws. These include, for example,
amended mandatory reporting laws making clear all the different personnel
required to report, removing sovereign immunity, lengthening statutes of
limitations, and the like.296 Such measures arguably aim to reduce people’s
opportunities to “escape the clutches” of the state with respect to child
protection.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have raised some questions about Abner Greene’s
arguments against obligation and in favor of agnosticism concerning not only
“the good” but also “the right.” I have indicated the many matters on which we
agree, and I have also highlighted some areas of disagreement. I have explored
some implications of his framework for children, a group that hardly appears in
his book. In considering the risks of providing groups with robust exemptions
from public laws, I have used the example of child sexual abuse and
mandatory reporting laws to highlight that the vulnerability of children
imposes special obligations on society, including an obligation to protect them
from abuse. When institutions are normative communities that families and
community members trust and to which they feel loyalty, and when parents
entrust their children to such communities, it is deeply disturbing when those
institutions violate that trust and fail to protect children. These cases give me
reason to resist Greene’s arguments in favor of robust rights for members of
groups – nomic communities – to live their lives by their own “laws” and
escape the clutches of the state whenever practicable. I fear there may be too
much agnosticism about when important public values should trump. I would
argue that the state, precisely because of its interest in the healthy development
of children and in protecting children from harms, is not merely one authority
among many competing for our allegiance.
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